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How can the international community save more children’s lives faster and more effectively in the 21
st 
century? This Working Paper analyzes the extent to which “frontloading” and predictable vaccine funding, 
as proposed by the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), is more effective in impacting 
vaccine coverage than spending vaccine funds equally throughout the lives of projects. The IFFIm is an 
initiative of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), and supported by the 
governments of the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Italy, Spain and Norway. An initial IFFIm 
investment of $4 billion is expected to prevent 5 million child deaths by 2015, and more than 5 million 
future adult deaths. Using a stylized model, the authors quantify the positive and negative effects of 
predictable vaccine funds and frontloading, and finds IFFIm’s approach can increase the impact of vaccine 
coverage by 22%. This is because stable and long-term financing allows vaccine manufacturers and 
countries to plan for long periods of time, knowing that resources will be available. Front-loading helps to 
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 2 Summary 
This paper estimates in stylized form the potential economic benefits of allowing spending on vaccines 
to be made more predictable, and of ‘front-loading’ spending to allow immunization to be scaled up more 
rapidly.
 1  For the purposes of this paper, ‘front-loading’ is defined as changing the phasing of a program so that 
it uses the same total inputs, but uses them more quickly so that outputs are realized sooner. 
The proposed International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) to increase spending on 
improving health systems and vaccines is one mechanism that could allow spending on vaccines to be 
front-loaded and more predictable.
2  This paper does not analyze the financial mechanism proposed for IFFIm.  
The focus of our analysis is to compare the extent to which predictable and front-loaded spending, as 
opposed to spending the same resources year to year, can impact vaccine coverage and health benefits. It is not 
our objective to validate previous estimates of the health benefits of the proposed increase in spending under 
IFFIm, but rather to analyze the extent to which those health benefits are affected by making the spending 
predictable and front-loaded. 
Immunization is generally recognized to be one of the most cost-effective development interventions.
3  
The UK Government quotes WHO estimates that additional spending of about $4bn would save the lives of 
more than 5 million children over the 10 year period, and would save a further 5 million future adult deaths as 
a result of hepatitis B immunization.
4  This paper considers whether the benefits of front-loading and 
predictability of spending on vaccines are likely to exceed the financial costs. 
We estimate that the overall health impact of spending on vaccines could be increased by about 22 
percent by making the spending front-loaded and predictable, even after taking into account the additional 
costs of private sector borrowing.
 5 Predictability adds about 11 percent to the health impact of spending, and 
front-loading adds an additional 10 percent. (These two effects multiply together to make 22 percent in total)
6
Table 1: Summary of estimated benefits of same total spending under alternative scenarios
Scenario  I  II  III 
  No front loading 
unpredictable 




a. Donor country contributions $4,475m  $4,475m  $4,475m 
b. Developing country contributions $1,074m  $1,074m  $1,074m 
c. Net cost of financing from front-loading  -  -  $150m 
d. Spending on vaccines and health services 
(a + b – c – all in NPV $2005)  
$5,549m $5,549m $5,399m 
Life-years gained
7 175 million  194 million  214 million 
Cost per life-year gained ($ / DALY)
8 $31 $28 $25 
Health benefits as a percent of Scenario I  100%  111%  122% 
 
  
 3 The cost-effectiveness of vaccines as a development intervention 
Immunization has been one of the most important successes in public health during the last 40 years. 
The Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) was launched by the World Health Assembly in 1974, 
aimed at increasing coverage of vaccines against six diseases (tuberculosis, diphtheria, neonatal tetanus, 
whooping cough, poliomyelitis and measles).
9  Globally, coverage with three doses of the 
Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis vaccine (DTP3) was increased from less than 5 percent in the early 1970s to 75 
percent by 1990; it fell during the 1990s to 72 percent in 1999; and by 2003 was back up to 78 percent.
10
As a result of these vaccinations, an estimated 3 million lives are saved each year, and an additional 
750 000 children are saved from permanent disability.
11 In 1993, the World Bank concluded that the six EPI 
vaccines together with hepatitis B vaccine, yellow fever and vitamin supplements (“EPI plus”) were among the 
most cost-effective health interventions for developing countries, ranging from US$16-22 per DALY gained in 
low income countries and US$ 33-39 per DALY gained in middle income countries.
12  Table 2 below sets out 
some estimates of the cost-effectiveness of vaccination in particular contexts. Note that the newer vaccines are 
currently more expensive than the older vaccines, and are therefore likely to be less cost-effective per DALY 
saved. 
Table 2. Estimates of cost-effectiveness of vaccination 




Measles <11.7  (2-15)  Foster et al. 
in Jamison et al. 1993  
EPI cluster: polio, DPT, BCG, measles: 
Low-income  14-20 Jamison  et al. 1993  
EPI cluster: polio, DPT, BCG, measles: 
Mid-income  29-41 Jamison  et al. 1993  
Hepatitis B 
Low-income countries, prevalence less than 2%  42-59  Miller, McCann 2000  
Hepatitis B  
Low-income countries, prevalence greater than 8 per cent  8-11  Miller, McCann 2000  
Hib 
(Africa)  21-22 Miller,  McCann  2000 
Hib 
(low-income Asia)  55  Miller, 1998  
 
By way of comparison, Table 3 below sets out estimates of the cost per DALY of a selection of other 
health interventions in developing countries.  As a guide to judging cost-effectiveness, development 
interventions are generally considered to be highly cost effective if the cost per DALY is less than $100.
14  
More recently, a country’s annual GDP per capita has been used as a benchmark.
 15  In the United States, the 
cost-effectiveness threshold is estimated to be $50,000 to $100,000 per DALY saved.
16   In the United 
Kingdom, the decisions of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence are consistent with an implicit cost 
effectiveness threshold of about £30,000 ($50,000) per DALY saved.
17
    
 4 Table 3: Cost per DALY of other health interventions
18
Condition  Cost per DALY  Source 
Tuberculosis 
Directly observed short therapy for smear positive patients 
Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (BCG) vaccine 




$10 to $20 
 
CMH Working Group 
5: Paper 8 
HIV/AIDS 
Condom distribution 
Improved Blood Safety  
Prevention of Mother-to-child transmission (nevirapine) 
Peer Education for commercial sex workers 










Insecticide treated bednets 
Residual spraying 
Chaemoprophylaxis for children 
 
$19 to 85 
$16 to $29 
$8 to $41 
Goodman, Coleman 
and Mills (2000) 
 
The need for improved immunization coverage 
Vaccines have been successful in greatly reducing the burden of diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio 
and measles. However, measles, pertussis, hepatitis B, diseases related to Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) 
and tuberculosis remain significant causes of death and disability, as shown in Table 4 below. 
Approximately 1.2 million people die each year of diseases which are preventable by the six basic 
vaccines of the EPI program. At least a further 2-3 million deaths a year could be avoided by full use of more 
recently-introduced vaccines, such as those which protect against Hib and Hepatitis B, and new vaccines 
which protect against rotavirus and pneumococcal diseases.
19  The expansion of vaccination in developing 
countries, both by increasing coverage for existing vaccines and by extending the use of new vaccines, to 
reduce these preventable deaths is a cost-effective way to reduce mortality and morbidity in developing 
countries. Increasing immunization is likely to make an indispensable contribution to achieving the fourth 
Millennium Development Goal, to reduce the rate of under-5 mortality by two-thirds between 1990 and 
2015.
20
 5 Table 3: Annual vaccine preventable deaths
21
Annual deaths (000s)  Under 5  Total 
Diseases for which vaccination is part of the EPI schedule 
Measles 540  610 
Pertussis 294  294 
Tetanus 198  213 
Diphtheria 4  5 
Polio <1  <1 
Other diseases for which vaccination is part of some 
countries’ vaccination schedules 
Yellow Fever  15  30 
Hib 386  386 
Hepatitis B  <1  600 
Diseases for which a licensed vaccine is available 
 but not yet widely used 
Japanese encephalitis  5  14 
Meningococcal 10  26 
Rotavirus 402  449 
Pneumococcal 716  1612 
Total  2,572  4,240 
 
Constraints on vaccine coverage and use 
There are two related causes of vaccine preventable deaths. First, 22% of the world’s children do not fully 
receive the basic package of childhood vaccinations; second, many of the children who receive those do not 
receive other, more expensive vaccines.
22 Vaccination rates are lowest in poor countries, and among the poor 
in middle-income countries.  The key constraints to greater vaccination coverage are: 
•  Financial barriers 
High vaccine prices remain an important barrier to the adoption of new vaccines.  Even in countries 
that can reach the majority of their children with cheaper vaccines – such as  DTP 
(Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis) and OPV (Oral Polio Vaccine)–  there are many children who do not 
receive the relatively expensive vaccines for Hib, and, to a lesser extent, Hepatitis B and Yellow Fever. 
This is only partly the result of insufficient coverage of immunization systems: in some cases the price 
of immunizing every child with all of these vaccines is too large to be accommodated within current 
health budgets in developing countries.  GAVI has made significant progress in addressing financing 
constraints, but total resources are still insufficient and most donors are willing to commit funds only 
for a relatively short period. Developing country health ministries are understandably reluctant to 
introduce new vaccines or extend immunization infrastructure without a clear picture of long-term 
sustainability of vaccine supply. This is a particular challenge at present as the first set of GAVI grant 
recipients are reaching the end of their funding. 
 
•  Delivery capacity 
Health systems need to be able to manage a comprehensive immunization strategy, including 
obtaining safe and effective vaccines, storage, logistics (including a cold-chain), waste disposal, social 
mobilization and communication, monitoring and evaluation, training staff to administer vaccines 
safely and managing adverse events. Substantial investments are needed to extend the reach of 
 6 vaccination to more children.  However, for a given level of vaccine coverage, the cost of adding 
another vaccine to the set of vaccines given to children who are already being immunized is generally 
relatively modest, if those vaccines can be administered in the same visit.  As a result the cost 
effectiveness of investment in immunization infrastructure increases as the number of vaccines that 
are delivered to each child during a visit increases.   
 
•  Procurement and planning constraints 
Ineffective demand forecasting, lack of coordination, lack of disease data and needs assessments, 
inability to enter into long term purchasing arrangements all contribute to higher prices than could be 
achieved with more predictable procurement, and lead to occasional supply shortages. (The 
Accelerated Development and Introduction Plans (ADIPs) for rotavirus and pneumococcus aim to 
address many of these constraints for these two diseases.
23)  
 
•  Inadequate monitoring and surveillance 
Accurate monitoring and surveillance data are essential for good management of service delivery and 
for early warnings of outbreaks. These efforts depend on capacity in remote areas, as well as central 
managerial and analytical capacity.  
 
Additional funding would both allow greater vaccine purchases and more investment in health systems to 
broaden coverage.  Additional funding can also make an important contribution to complementary 
improvements in health system management to allow improved forecasting, monitoring and surveillance.   
 
The IFF for Immunization (IFFIm) 
GAVI proposes to increase the resources available for childhood vaccines in GAVI-eligible countries 
over the coming years, by seeking long term donor pledges which they can securitize and use to front-load 
funding for vaccination programs.  According to GAVI,
24 this will allow both developing countries and 
vaccine manufacturers to plan for longer periods of time knowing the necessary resources will be available. 
This is expected to secure better pricing, accelerate increased availability of new vaccines, and support the 
substantial system improvements required to absorb new vaccines such as pneumococcal and rotavirus. The 
goal is to scale up coverage to 90% in every country, in accordance with the goals set in the World Fit for 
Children declaration in 2002.  
The IFFIm proposal seeks financing of over $4 billion over 10 years.  According to the project 
documentation, this is intended to supplement GAVI support to increase routine coverage in the 30 GAVI 
eligible countries to 90% by 2015, compared with the current average of 50%.
25 The programme is estimated 
to have the potential to save an estimated 5.3 million lives in the years to 2015, and prevent a future five 
million adult deaths that would otherwise be caused by hepatitis B in adulthood, in addition to the 1.5 million 
deaths that could be prevented if support for the Global Alliances for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) 
continues at its current level of resources.
26  The UK Department for International Development estimates that 
the benefit:cost ratio of this spending on vaccines would be over 10:1 (at a real discount rate of 3.5%), and the 
NPV of the programme as a whole would be $60bn.
27  The analysis recognises that there are risks that weak 
absorptive capacity might undermine the effectiveness of the program, but notes that half the proposed 
resources are for system strengthening and that most of the barriers to expanded immunisation at local and 
community level are amenable to being dealt with through increased financial resources. 
  In addition to providing additional spending, the IFFIm proposal suggests that the productivity of 
spending on vaccines and health systems can be increased by (a) front-loading the spending; and (b) making 
the spending more predictable: 
 7 “Front-loading development assistance will allow for more sustainable planning and generate 
greater benefits than traditional aid programmes.  … A major constraint plaguing immunization 
efforts in recent years has been the lack of stable, predictable and coordinated cash flows for an 
extended period. The IFFIm addresses this concern and provides flexibility by mediating between 
necessary disbursements and the timing of donor payments. The IFFIm allows both developing 
countries and vaccine manufacturers to plan for longer periods of time knowing the necessary 
resources will be available. This predictability increases efficiency, planning and results.” 
(Source: IFFIm website
28) 
The focus of our analysis is to compare the extent to which predictable and front-loaded spending, as 
opposed to spending the same resources spread evenly and without predictability, can impact vaccine coverage 
and health benefits. It is not our objective to validate previous estimates of the health benefits of the proposed 
increase in spending under IFFIm, but rather to analyze the extent to which those health benefits are affected 
by making the spending predictable and front-loaded. 
The IFFIm Financial Mechanism 
This section, which is drawn from the IFFIm proposal and accompanying analysis, explains the 
financial mechanism underlying IFFIm.  To achieve predictability and front-loading, IFFIm envisages the 
establishment of a mechanism to borrow from private capital markets, on the basis of donor commitments of 
future spending.  This would provide funds which can be programmed (and if necessary committed) in 
advance, and which can be spent sooner (that is, front-loaded).  




There is a cost to borrowing money, namely interest costs and financial transactions costs. Analytically, 
this gives rise to the question of whether the benefits of front-loading and predictability are greater or less than 
the costs resulting from the interest and transactions costs of borrowing the money.  For this proposal to be 
preferable to existing mechanisms for funding immunization programs, the benefits of predictability and 
front-loading would need to exceed the financial costs. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the financial mechanism proposed for the IFFIm.  We 
have taken as given the estimated financial costs of borrowing under IFFIm as a benchmark against which to 
 8 compare our estimates of the benefits of predictability and front-loading.  Clearly, if there are other ways to 
achieve these benefits but which involve lower financial costs, that would be better value for money. 
Theoretical consideration of the costs and benefits of predictability and front-loading 
  This section considers the benefits and costs of predictability and front-loading from a theoretical 
perspective.   The following section then considers the approximate size of these effects, using an empirical 
model. 
The theoretical benefits of predictability 
 The  first expected benefit of predictability is increasing the likelihood of investment by firms in 
larger-scale production capacity and reducing vaccine prices if they have more certainty about future 
demand. Appendix A sets out the economic theory supporting this, and uses a simple empirical example to 
illustrate the potential magnitude of these effects.
 30  The analysis shows that it may be in both the firms’ and 
the buyers’ interests for there to be more certainty about future vaccine demand before the firm invests in 
production capacity.  
If vaccine procurement is unpredictable, and if contracts cannot be agreed to in advance, firms have to 
determine what quantity to produce several years before the price and quantity is agreed to with the purchasers.  
(A vaccine manufacturing plant costs about $¼-½ billion, and has a lead time of 3 years or more.
31)  In these 
circumstances it may not be rational for a firm to invest in large-scale capacity sufficient to serve the needs of 
the developing world, because once the firm has sunk investment in this capacity, it bears the risk that the 
vaccines it can produce will not be bought. An investment by a firm in large-scale capacity may weaken its 
negotiating position when it subsequently tries to agree to a price and quantity with buyers (there are few 
outside markets for high volumes of vaccine).  Because firms foresee that they will not have a strong hand in 
negotiations once the plant is built, they have little incentive to invest in large-scale production unless they 
have obtained a commitment on the price they will obtain for their products.  So even though there are very 
large returns to scale in vaccine production, it is not in the firm’s interest to build a large vaccine plant unless 
they have prior commitments on price and quantity.   
The quantified analysis in Appendix A shows that agreements to buy vaccines before a firm builds a 
production plant would likely result in much more cost-effective contracts for purchasers, and so larger health 
benefits for a given budget. In our hypothetical example, the expected number of vaccines purchased could be 
increased by 50 percent if donors would agree to quantity and price in advance.  Put another way, if donors 
insist on “keeping their options open”, they are likely to have a choice among options which all entail higher 
vaccine prices than if they are prepared to limit their future discretion by negotiating a contract in advance.  
Such contracts are only possible if spending on vaccines is sufficiently predictable for purchasers to enter into 
long-term, predictable contracts.  
Significant price reductions are likely mainly for those vaccines for which there are not yet a large 
number of competing manufacturers, and which are currently considerably more expensive than the 
established vaccines such as DTP and OPV.   
The second expected benefit of predictability is that it will allow the governments and health service 
managers of developing countries to make investments to increase coverage.  Developing countries, and 
their donor partners, sometimes hesitate about investing in infrastructure for vaccine delivery, including 
training, logistics, cold-chain, public awareness and outreach, if the future flow of vaccines at affordable prices 
is uncertain.  For example, one reason for the low rates of roll-out of both Hepatitis B and Hib in the past 
decade has been uncertainty about the prospects for affordable supply of these vaccines when the transitional 
funding provided by GAVI runs out.  More predictable funding would enable countries to make long-term, 
informed choices about which products they want to introduce into their vaccination schedule and when, to 
make appropriate arrangements for investments in health service infrastructure and to budget for their 
co-payments for vaccine procurement. 
 9 The third expected benefit of predictability is that it enables investments to be planned and phased 
to achieve the most efficient use of resources over time.  If budgets for health service improvements and the 
purchase of vaccines are decided from year to year, then there will inevitably be an ad hoc allocation each year 
between systems investments and vaccine procurement.  If future funds for vaccine procurement are more 
reliable, by contrast, then spending can be programmed over time to invest first in health systems and increased 
coverage, and then in the vaccines that can be delivered through those enhanced systems.  More efficient 
vaccination, for example through greater use of routine immunization and lower dependence on one-off 
campaigns, can increase the cost-effectiveness of spending on immunization. 
32
The anticipated costs of predictability 
The main expected cost of greater predictability is that there is some risk that donors will be 
committed to making payments in the future which, when the time comes, either no longer represent the 
donor’s political priorities, or which are no longer the most cost-effective available intervention.  For 
example, more cost-effective alternatives may become available or new diseases may emerge which are higher 
priorities. However, vaccination has a long record as a very cost-effective and effective development 
intervention, so the risk is small that donors would find themselves committed to investments in vaccination 
that they would no longer want to make. 
The second expected cost of predictability is that the legislative and administrative arrangements 
for expenditure commitments may prevent donors from making commitments, or they could only do so with 
very high transaction costs. The extent of this cost varies from one jurisdiction to another, and if there is 
sufficient political will the obstacles to these commitments can be overcome.  IFFIm is one way in which 
donors can make spending more predictable and front-loaded, and we have used this mechanism as the basis of 
our estimates of the benefits front-loading and predictability.  
The anticipated benefits of front-loading 
  Three main benefits are anticipated from front-loading of spending on health systems and the purchase 
of vaccines: reducing the disease epidemic, increased economic benefits, and greater predictability for 
suppliers. 
 The  first expected benefit of front-loading is on the impact of the disease burden.  As we show in 
a simplified model, for some (but not all) diseases, immunization benefits not only the vaccinated individual, 
whose risk of catching the disease is reduced, but also other people who come into contact with that individual 
as the population risk of catching the disease is also reduced.  This effect is called “herd immunity”.  
  The most extreme form of this benefit is apparent for those diseases which can be eradicated altogether, 
such as smallpox and perhaps polio.  Smallpox was eradicated in 1980, after a 15 year campaign led by the 
World Health Organization (WHO).  The total cost of eradication of the disease was $300 million. It has been 
estimated that the United States saves the total cost of all its contributions to the eradication of smallpox every 
26 days.
33
  Disease eradication is a limiting case of the more general spill-over benefit to one individual of 
vaccination of another.  Suppose that, at the margin, a government can afford to vaccinate two individuals, and 
it can choose whether to vaccinate them both this year, both next year, or one each year.  In most cases, it will 
be better to vaccinate them both this year, as not only will two individuals benefit from vaccination, but other 
members of the population will benefit both this year and next from a lower risk of catching the disease.  If the 
vaccinations are spread evenly, the total herd immunity benefits for the population are less than if the 
vaccinations are front-loaded.   However, as coverage rates increase to very high levels, the additional benefits 
of herd immunity fall, because there are fewer susceptible people in the population to benefit.  The optimal 
level of vaccination depends on, among other things, the characteristics of the disease and of the population. 
Herd immunity effects have been demonstrated for vaccines against diseases such as pertussis, typhoid 
and yellow fever, and for both oral and inactivated polio vaccines.
34 For other vaccines, especially those which 
 10 have little effect on disease transmission, such as BCG and tetanus, there is thought to be little or no 
herd-immunity benefit from vaccination. 
 The  second expected benefit of front-loading is that there are likely to be continuing economic and 
fiscal benefits to the recipient country from lower levels of disease. A front-loaded program will realize these 
benefits more quickly. These include higher productivity and lower costs to health services resulting from 
disease. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that health is a key determinant of productivity and economic 
growth.
35  Futhermore, high levels of mortality can lead to low levels of saving and investment, and hence low 
levels of economic growth. One recent study found that high adult mortality in Africa can statistically account 
for all of Africa’s growth shortfall since 1960.
36  In principle, it is also likely that the cost of vaccinating future 
cohorts of children might be financed largely by future savings in health care costs, which result from today’s 
vaccination. Because the benefits are a future stream of higher economic activity and lower health costs 
throughout the lifetime of the protected cohort, a front-loaded vaccination program could generate larger 
benefits over time than a program which is spread over time. 
The third benefit of front-loading is that it could add to the predictability of the spending on the 
vaccination program. While firms may respond positively to longer term procurement contracts which could 
be available under predictable funding, they may discount future revenues to take account of the perceived risk 
of default. Front-loading the revenues provides immediate payments rather than the promise of future 
payments, and so further reduces the risk to firms. In principle, this should reduce the price at which firms are 
willing to sell vaccines. Note that this is an additional effect over and above the benefits of predictability 
through long-term contracting. 
There is a fourth, more technical, benefit of front-loading, which is included in our estimates.  In 
line with convention (though not uncontroversially), we discount future DALYs saved at a discount rate of 3% 
a year. This reflects the principle that future benefits are less valuable than benefits achieved today.
37  It 
means that the total estimated health benefits of vaccinations administered over 20 years are lower than the 
benefits of the same number of vaccinations administered over 15 years, other things being equal.  (Note that if 
the annual cost of finance is broadly comparable to the discount rate on future benefits then, other things being 
equal, the benefits of bringing forward a fixed amount of health gains would approximately equal the financial 
costs of doing so.) 
It is important to recognize that front-loading resources will not deliver all of the health benefits 
outlined above if the addition of financial resources will not alleviate the binding constraints vaccination 
coverage  For example, if inadequate health infrastructure is the main reason why some children are not 
vaccinated with all the available vaccines, and some are not vaccinated at all, and if the health infrastructure 
could not be improved if more money were available, then frontloading of expenditure would not result in the 
benefits described here. In our model, based on the original IFFIm proposal, about half the additional spending 
is allocated to improving health systems to improve vaccine coverage, based on extrapolations from detailed 
estimates of the costs of increasing coverage. 
The anticipated costs of front-loading 
The principal cost of front-loading is the financial cost.  In principle, donors could choose to 
re-phase their spending on support for vaccinations, making those commitments predictable without specific 
borrowing.  For example, donors can re-phase spending within existing budgetary allocations. This spending 
would be implicitly financed by additional government borrowing which would typically be cheaper than 
borrowing from the private sector. In practice, budgetary constraints or administrative arrangements in some 
donor countries make it unlikely or impossible for them to change the profile of their spending in this way.  
Rather than public borrowing, the IFFIm proposal is to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle company, 
IFFIm Co, which would borrow money in commercial markets, using the donor commitments as security. 
IFFIm Co could then use that capital to make spending both front-loaded and predictable. 
This private borrowing will incur interest and financial transactions costs.  The total additional cost of 
private borrowing is represented by the difference between the net present value of the total stream of 
 11 expenditure commitments and the net present value of the total stream of disbursements.  As shown in Table 4 
below, the Department for International Development estimates that the additional financing costs resulting 
from private borrowing will be 3.5 percent of the total expenditure.
38 This can be regarded as the net cost of 
front-loading in a context in which front-loading is possible only through borrowing from the private sector. 
Table 4: Key Financial Aggregates for the IFFIm Model Base case
Aggregate  Amount 
(1) Undiscounted cash value of IFFIm pledges  $7,345m 
(2) Undiscounted cash value of IFFIm disbursements   $4,000m 
(3) Additional disbursements from cash cushion (assuming no 
default) 
$1,694m 
(4) Total cash value of interest payments  $1,650m 
(5) Total cash value of IFFIm costs and other fees  $93m 
(6) NPV of disbursements and ‘spare cash’  $4,325m 
(7) NPV of pledges (including IFFIm fees)  $4,475m 
(8) Difference between (6) and (7)  $150m 
(9) (8) as a % of (6)  3.5% 
Source: Department for International Development (2005) 
 
A second expected cost of front-loading is that the marginal cost of vaccinating an additional 
child in each country is likely to increase as total vaccine coverage in that country increases.  The costs of 
vaccinating children at low vaccine coverage levels tend to be lower because those children are easily reached 
are have easy access to health clinics or facilities.  The costs at high vaccine coverage levels increase greatly 
because those harder to reach children often live in more geographically remote areas or may be more socially 
excluded.  (Marginal costs may fall as coverage increases when coverage is low because of returns to scale; 
however, costs of reaching additional children increase again when coverage is high because of the cost of 
reaching the most remote or excluded children.
39)  
If vaccinations are front-loaded, then average coverage rates would be higher than if the same number 
of vaccinations were delivered over a longer time. With increasing marginal costs, these higher coverage rates 
may imply higher average costs and hence, for a fixed total of additional spending, lower immunization rates 
than if the spending is not front-loaded. 
A possible third cost of front-loading could be that vaccine prices would be higher, on average.  This 
might happen if the prices of vaccines (especially of new vaccines) are expected to fall over the years under 
consideration, so concentrating more of the purchases in the early years will increase the average price paid.  In 
addition, prices might actually increase temporarily as a result of the expansion of demand caused by 
front-loading (with supply inelastic in the short term).  For example, the additional demand for vaccines that 
followed the creation of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization may have contributed to the 
increase in Hib vaccine prices.
40  This effect emphasizes the importance of ensuring that front-loading and 
predictability are introduced together.  Front-loading without increasing predictability might actually reduce 
the cost-effectiveness of vaccine purchases if it drives up short term vaccine prices. 
Assessing the relative size of the costs and benefits of predictability and front-loading 
We used a spreadsheet model to estimate the relative size of these various effects and so determine 
whether the benefits of predictable and front-loaded spending on vaccines are likely to exceed the financing 
costs. (For the purposes of comparison with the estimated benefits, we have used the estimated financing costs 
of IFFIm as the basis of comparison, but the results are applicable however front-loading is financed.)  
 12 To do this, we adapted the models of vaccination coverage and costs originally created by the World 
Health Organization for the purpose of estimating the effects of the IFFIm program.  This was not the purpose 
for which the models were originally developed, and our approach is limited by a number of simplifications 
and assumptions that we have made.  We have organized the models in a form which enables us to estimate the 
impact of changes in the amount and timing of spending on vaccination coverage and health benefits. 
Changes in vaccine coverage as a result of changes in spending are calculated by country.  The 
coverage rates are then aggregated into WHO 14 sub-regions to calculate health benefits, which are based on 
our extrapolations from WHO estimates of DALYs lost in 2002.
41  DALYs saved are calculated by multiplying 
the number of people vaccinated in a cohort, the efficacy of the vaccine, and our estimate of the lifetime DALY 
burden per person for that disease in that sub-region, based on the WHO estimates of actual DALYs lost in 
2002.  This estimates the total DALYs saved for that cohort. Future DALYs saved are discounted to 2005 at an 
annual rate of 3 percent. 
  An outline of the structure of our model is shown in the diagram below. 
Figure 1: Diagram of Spreadsheet Model 
 
Comparison of three scenarios 
  To identify the impact of front loading and predictability, we compared three different scenarios, set 
out in Table 5 below.  
 
 13 Table 5: Comparison of three scenarios 
Scenario  I  II  III 
Descriptions  No front loading 
unpredictable 




End year  2020  2020  2015 
Spending on vaccines and health services ($m)  $4,475m $4,475m $4,325m 
Financing costs ($m)  $0m $0m  $150m 
Total donor contribution ($m)  $4,475m $4,475m $4,475m 
 
Comparison of scenarios 
 
 
Front loading  Predictability 
 
Broadly speaking, a comparison of Scenario I and Scenario II provides an estimate of the benefits of 
greater predictability; while a comparison of Scenario II and Scenario III provides an estimate of the benefits 
of front-loading, assuming predictability. (Scenario III is meant to be broadly equivalent to the IFFIm 
proposal.) 
We have kept the total additional spending on vaccines and systems the same in all three scenarios in 
NPV terms, for the purposes of comparison between the scenarios.  No assumption is made in any scenario 
about the evolution of spending at the end of the period (ie after 15 years in scenarios I and II, and 10 years in 
scenario III) as we measure only the lifetime benefits to the cohorts of children born over the next 15 years. 
Clearly, in the real world, steps would need to be taken to ensure that there is no precipitate fall in funding at 
the end of 10 or 15 years, both because such a fall would deny the benefits of vaccination to future generations, 
and because the anticipation of such a fall would have an impact on behavior before the end of the period (e.g. 
on vaccine production volumes, prices, infrastructure investment, and public acceptance of the vaccination 
program). 
The actual use of additional vaccine funding would in practice depend on countries’ own analysis of 
their needs in the circumstances of the time. Furthermore, estimates of the impact of the additional spending on 
coverage, and the impact of additional vaccination on the disease burden, are necessarily highly uncertain.  
Given these uncertainties, our goal is not to validate previous cost-effectiveness estimates of vaccination; 
rather, by using a common set of assumptions about spending choices and potential impact for comparing the 
three scenarios, our aim is to identify and isolate the specific impacts of predictability and front-loading by 
comparison with a similar magnitude of spending on vaccines without predictability or front-loading.  (One 
limitation of this approach is that the estimated benefits of front-loading are estimates that also assume 
predictability.) 
The realization of health benefits depends on the ability of countries to build up health systems 
sufficiently to deliver additional vaccines and to extend vaccine coverage.  The additional resources required 
for health systems to allow this to happen are explicitly included in the model developed to analyze the IFFIm 
proposal, and we have followed a similar approach.  While additional resources needed to improve health 
systems are explicitly included, it is assumed that there are no other constraints that cannot be lifted through the 
provision of financial resources. This assumption is reasonable if there is a sufficiently flexible mechanism for 
allocating resources so that that vaccines are supplied where they can be used, and investments are made to 
overcome bottlenecks in country health systems.   
To estimate Scenario III we have followed as closely as possible the estimates of the costs and 
benefits of the IFFIm package as set out in the GAVI proposal.  We are most grateful to the WHO Department 
of Immunization, Vaccines and Biologicals for the access they have granted us to their data and models that 
 14 they use to analyze the likely impact of policy measures.  Our spreadsheet model seeks to replicate the WHO 
approach where possible, but makes a large number of assumptions to simplify the analysis.  For example, our 
estimates of the benefits of increased vaccination coverage depend on sub-regional, not country, level 
estimates of the burden of disease.  Furthermore, whereas the WHO model first estimates possible scenarios 
for improving coverage (taking into account a range of barriers, not just financial) and then derives the costs of 
increasing coverage, our model works in reverse, deriving the implied coverage improvements that could be 
achieved at different levels of investment (assuming that the non-financial barriers to increased coverage are 
unchanged between the scenarios). 
 To  estimate  Scenario II (predictable but no front-loading), our model assumes that the total donor 
spending is spread over 15 years instead of 10 years.  The NPV of the spending is unchanged. There are no 
longer any direct financing costs, and these resources are instead allocated to systems delivery and vaccines.  
The funds are allocated geographically, and by disease, in the same proportions and trajectory as the spending 
in Scenario III.  In effect, we have simply stretched the spending profiles for Scenario III over 15 years instead 
of 10. 
 To  estimate  Scenario I (not predictable and no front loading), we adapt Scenario II to take account 
of the impact of higher vaccine prices for new and underused vaccines resulting from lack of predictability, 
which reduces coverage.  As a result of these higher prices, coverage of all the new and underused vaccines is 
lower. 
Other important assumptions 
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions: 
•  the estimated benefits are calculated over the lifetime of the cohorts vaccinated during the program 
rather than on a yearly basis; 
•  the estimated benefits do not include any benefits to later cohorts  (e.g. herd immunity benefits to later 
cohorts of a lower incidence of disease; or benefits to subsequent cohorts from having a better 
infrastructure in place); 
•  the total expenditure, including financing costs, is assumed to have the same net present value in all 
scenarios; 
•  the benefits of reduced mortality and morbidity are assumed to be additive across diseases. 
•  we have assumed that there is no change in the number and timing of campaigns against measles, and 
tetanus, and that the health benefits of these campaigns are unchanged in all scenarios. We have not 
included herd immunity benefits from campaigns, except to the extent to which they are indirectly 
included in the estimates of DALYs occurring in 2002 on which our benefit estimates are based. 
A more detailed account of our assumptions is set out in Appendix C. 
 15 Table 6: Summary of effects and inclusion in model   
Effects of predictability and front-loading  Is this effect captured
in the model? 
Advantages of predictability   
+ Lower vaccine prices  Yes 
+ Investments to increase coverage  Yes 
+ More efficient use of health resources  No 
Disadvantages of predictability   
- Risk that donors are committed to vaccination and it is no longer cost-effective  No 
- Expensive arrangements needed to facilitate predictability  Yes 
Advantages of frontloading   
+ Herd immunity  Yes (approximately) 
+ Long term economic benefits from earlier reduction in disease; health care costs averted  No 
+ Adds to predictability of contracts and so reduces prices  Yes 
+ Discounting of future DALYs   Yes 
Disadvantages of frontloading   
- Financial costs of front loading  Yes 
- Increased average costs of vaccination   Yes 
- Higher vaccine prices if contracts not predictable  Yes 
Limitations 
Our estimates are based on a stylized model and there is a significant margin of error. Estimates of the 
disease burden, vaccine prices, delivery costs, and the cost of increasing vaccine coverage are all highly 
uncertain. We attach significantly greater weight to the comparisons between scenarios than we do to the total 
health benefits estimated for each scenario. 
The scenarios did not attempt to estimate some effects which might affect the relationship between the 
scenarios. We did not include: 
•  any long run differences arising from changes in variables at the end of the scenarios; for example on 
systems coverage, long run vaccine prices or the incidence of disease burden;  
•  possible increases in investment in research and development on new vaccines which might result 
from larger and more predictable donor spending on vaccines; 
•  improved efficiency of investment in health systems resulting from more carefully planned spending; 
These effects would be likely to increase the benefits of front-loading and predictability, and so our results 
may understate the effects of moving from conventional financing to front-loaded and predictable financing.   
We take as given the UK Department for International Development’s estimate of the financing costs of 
IFFIm. We have not considered a hypothetical alternative scenario, in which donors find a way to make their 
commitments predictable and front-loaded, but without requiring private sector borrowing (for example, by 
rephasing their budgeted expenditure plans, and making administrative arrangements to commit that spending 
in advance).  Any scenario in which the benefits of front-loading and predictability can be achieved without 
incurring the financial costs of private sector borrowing will represent better value for money than a 
second-best solution in which those benefits are obtained with the cost of borrowing from the private sector. 
 16 Estimating herd immunity 
As set out in Appendix B, even quite simple epidemiological models of disease exhibit highly complex, 
non-linear dynamics which make it very difficult to estimate the trajectory of herd-immunity effects.  Because 
vaccination is generally highly-cost effective even without including the benefits of herd immunity, many 
estimates of the cost effectiveness of vaccination either ignore these effects altogether, or make only simplified 
assumptions.  This produces conservative estimates of vaccination cost-effectiveness, but excluding these 
effects may also understate the value of front-loading a vaccination program. 
Our approach, set out in more detail in Appendix B, has been to use a simplified generic model for all 
diseases, but to exclude the dynamic terms of the equations. These dynamic terms can be large, but the 
variation terms of the equation have zero mean, which means that they cancel each other out over a large 
number of years.  By excluding these, our simplified model does not have predictive power for the level of the 
disease burden in any one year, but provides a very broad estimate of the impact on disease burden over a 
number of years taken together. 
The price impact of predictability 
  Both theory and a simple empirical calibration, set out in Appendix A, suggest more predictable 
procurement of vaccines would lead to a reduction in prices, especially for new and underused vaccines, and 
that this price reduction might be substantial.  In particular, we find that both buyers and producers are likely to 
be better off if demand is more predictable, because firms can invest in the appropriate size of production 
facilities, so increasing volumes and reducing prices.  Buyers benefit from cheaper vaccines, and firms can 
make larger returns, than if buyers reserve the right to negotiate on prices and quantities after the production 
facilities are built.  
We have not sought to model the outcome of the negotiation between suppliers and procurement 
agencies at different levels of demand and predictability. To estimate the likely impact of predictability on 
vaccine prices, we have instead used scenarios for the price of pentavalent vaccines prepared for the GAVI 
December 2004 Board Meeting.
42   The price levels in these various scenarios have been discussed – but not 
necessarily agreed – with various stakeholders in the vaccine supply community. The way in which these 
assumptions have been used is explained in Appendix A.  The benefits of predictability on vaccines are 
assumed to be confined to new and underused vaccines, such as Hepatitis B, Hib, but not for well-established 
vaccines that are already produced in large volumes such as DTP and OPV. The estimated reductions in price 
using this approach are of the same order of magnitude as those predicted by a McKinsey study for the GAVI 
Financial Task Force.
43
Our model assumes that purchasing authorities make use of greater predictability of financing by 
entering into specific long term supply contracts.  In other words, it is not enough merely that there is an 
increased likelihood of spending in the future on vaccines in general, or even on vaccines that protect against a 
particular disease. For the reasons set out in Appendix A, the really large reductions in vaccine prices depend 
on the purchasers’ willingness to enter into specific supply contracts, for an agreed price and volume of 
vaccine, in advance.   
 

















  In the front-loaded scenario, vaccine coverage is higher for the first ten years, but the additional 
spending is assumed for the purposes of this analysis to end in 2016.  In all scenarios, expenditure is expected 
to return to the current, baseline level of spending at the end of the period. (This assumption, which may not be 
realistic, ensures that we compare the same total expenditure in all three scenarios.)   
  Figure 2 below shows the estimated effect on coverage for hepatitis B predicted by our model.  As 
expected, the coverage is, as expected, significantly higher over the first 10 years than in a scenario in which 
the same spending is spread over 15 years.  Comparing the fifteen year scenarios, coverage is slightly higher 
when spending is predictable, because vaccine prices are lower and hence a larger number of children can be 
vaccinated. 








































Results: health benefits 
  Our estimates find that there are likely to be significant overall health benefits from both predictability 
and from front-loading of spending. 
  We find that predictability makes a very significant difference, increasing the impact of the program 
(measured as total DALYs saved) by 11 percent.  The main reason for this is the fall in prices of new vaccines 
that is anticipated if donors are able to enter into long term commitments and predictable procurement, which 
enables more vaccines to be purchased for a given amount of spending.  While the exact size of the fall in 
prices is highly uncertain, both vaccine producers and purchasers would benefit from greater certainty in 
vaccine procurement. 
We find that front-loading also makes a very substantial difference, improving the impact of the 
program by an additional 10 percent.  This is the result of price effects, herd-immunity effects, and the 
discounting of future benefits.  
  Taken together, our stylized model estimates that predictability and front-loading as proposed in the 
IFFIm would increase the health impact of spending on immunization by some 22 percent (measured as 
discounted DALYs saved), even taking into account the costs of financing.  The benefits of predictability and 
front-loading are an order of magnitude higher than the additional financial costs from front-loading, which are 
estimated at 3.5% of the net present value of the total outlays. 
Sensitivity to assumptions
We have run the model under a variety of different scenarios, summarized in Table 7 below: 
 19 Table 7: Summary of model variants: DALY losses averted under each scenario
Variants   I  II  III   II / I  III / II  III / I 
Discounted DALY losses averted 















Main scenario     175 million  194 million  214 million    11%  10%  22% 
1.  No herd immunity    138 million  157 million  159 million    14%  1%  15% 
2.  No discounting of future DALYs saved    221 million  246 million  258 million    11%  5%  17% 
3. Smaller fall in vaccine prices due to 
predictability (10% rather than 20%) 
  175 million  192 million  212 million    10%  10%  21% 
4. No price effect from front-loading     175 million  194 million  209 million    11%  8%  19% 
5. Overall spending decreased to $3bn    139 million  154 million  169 million    11%  10%  22% 
6. Constant marginal delivery costs    182 million  201 million  221 million    10%  10%  21% 
7. Double extra financing costs to $300m    175 million  194 million  210 million    11%  8%  19% 
 
A research agenda 
These are, at best, broad estimates, based on an extension of the framework for analyzing IFFIm which 
was developed by the WHO.  We believe that this analysis gives reasonable approximation of the orders of 
magnitude, but that it should initiate further analysis.  Over a longer period of time, additional items could be 
adapted within this framework to extend the analysis: 
•  a more formal model of the impact of predictability and front-loading on vaccine prices, 
perhaps using a game theoretic model of bargaining between a monopolistic or oligopolistic 
supplier with a monopsonist buyer;  
•  disease-specific models of herd-immunity, perhaps with less simplified dynamic effects;  
•  a more detailed model of how additional funds for immunization are allocated across 
countries and diseases, in order to secure the largest possible benefit, rather than maintaining 
the proportions assumed in the IFFIm programme; 
•  a model of health care costs averted, which we expect would strengthen the case for 
front-loading of investment in vaccines. 
The estimates presented here of the impact of predictability and front-loading are likely to be 
conservative, in part to avoid overstating the case for front-loading and predictability.  We anticipate that the 
more detailed analyses suggested here would tend to increase, rather than reduce, the estimates of the benefits 
for front-loading and predictability. 
Conclusions 
  There are strong theoretical reasons for thinking that predictability and front-loading would have both 
positive and negative effects on the cost-effectiveness of immunization programs.  Using a stylized empirical 
model, we have attempted to quantify the magnitudes of these effects. 
  We estimate conservatively that the impact of the International Finance Facility for Immunization 
might be increased by 22 percent as a result of predictability and front loading over using the same funds in a 
different way.  Predictability alone would increase the impact by 11 percent if long term procurement contracts 
could be agreed. Front-loading was estimated to increase the health benefits of vaccination by an additional 10 
percent. 
 20   Though our estimates are subject to wide margins of error, the benefits of front-loading and 
predictability appear significantly to outweigh the financial costs.  Our sensitivity analysis shows that this 
conclusion is robust to a range of assumptions. 
  We therefore conclude that the effectiveness of spending on immunization programs would be 
significantly increased by arrangements which enable spending to be predictable and front-loaded, even after 
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 21 Appendix A: The effect of predictability on vaccine prices 
  The market for vaccines has a number of characteristics that are important determinants of vaccine 
prices: 
•  Vaccine production is characterized by high fixed costs and low variable costs. Mercer Consulting 
estimates that, for a given plant, variable costs make up 15% or less of the total cost of vaccine 
production; and significantly less than this if R&D and marketing costs are included.
45  There are thus 
significant economies of scale: if production volumes double, the cost-per-vaccine is significantly 
reduced, by close to 50 percent. 
•  There are barriers to entry which prevent new producers from entering the market. These include 
intellectual property rights and trade secrets, manufacturing complexity, and regulatory requirements. 
The result is that producers have a period of market exclusivity of ten to twenty years. (Vaccines are 
generally harder markets for generic manufacturers to enter than non-biological pharmaceuticals, 
because the process of manufacture is more complex, harder to copy, and subject to regulatory 
approval.) 
•  There are long lead times between investment and production.  Investment in production facilities is 
made 3-5 years before vaccines are produced; research and development, and regulatory approval, 
might take ten to twenty years.  
•  Most vaccines are purchased on behalf of developing countries by international procurement agencies 
such as UNICEF and PAHO. These near monopsonies create significant market power for 
purchasers who seek lower prices to maximize the value of money for scarce health resources.   
•  Because UNICEF and PAHO depend on funding from donors as well as demand forecasts, they are 
typically unable to enter into long term contracts.  Purchases depend on the availability of donor 
funding, which is not predictable. Vaccine demand is therefore variable and uncertain. 
As we shall see below, this combination of characteristics creates market conditions in which rational 
behavior by producers and purchasers can lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium, which could be improved for both 
parties if contracts could be signed before the firm decides on the plant size.  This is a typical outcome of 
investment under uncertainty which is characteristic of industries in which there are significant returns to scale 
and in which investment decisions are made before the price is agreed, such as power generation and telecoms 
networks.
46
Theoretical predictions of the impact on vaccine prices 
Without long term commitments, this market is likely to lead to insufficient investment, low capacity, 
higher prices, and low volumes, for two reasons. 
First, uncertainty about future demand creates a risk for producers. Investment in greater production 
capacity may lead to substantially lower unit costs of vaccines in the future. The cost of this investment – 
which may be hundreds of millions of dollars – are borne by producers.  If the benefits – in the form of lower 
vaccine prices – mainly accrue to the purchasers, then it may not be optimal for the producer to make this 
investment. 
The following hypothetical example illustrates the problem.  Buyers (eg donors) are assumed to want 
to spend either $2m a year or $1m a year on a particular vaccine, and each is equally probable. The firm has to 
decide how big a plant to build before they know how much the buyers are willing to spend.  A larger plant 
costs more to build, but results in lower unit costs and lower prices.  If a large plant is built and demand is high, 
the firm gets a higher profit and buyers benefit from lower prices.  But if a large plant is built and demand is 
low, then the firm faces low profits, or even losses, because they cannot recoup the cost of the investment.  
 22 Table A1: Illustration of the effect of demand uncertainty 
  Big plant  Small plant 
Scenario  High demand  Low demand  High demand  Low demand 
   
Expenditure  $2,000,000 $1,000,000 $2,000,000 $1,000,000
Quantity  10,000,000 2,857,143 6,666,667 2,222,222
Price  $0.20 $0.35 $0.30 $0.45
   
Investment (amortized)  $500,000 $500,000 $200,000 $200,000
Variable cost ($)  $0.10 $0.10 $0.20 $0.20
Fixed cost ($)  $0.05 $0.18 $0.03 $0.09
Total unit cost ($)  $0.15 $0.28 $0.23 $0.29
Revenue  $2,000,000 $1,000,000 $2,000,000 $1,000,000
Total cost  $1,500,000 $785,714 $1,533,333 $644,444
Profit ($)  $500,000 $214,286 $466,667 $355,556
Expected profit ($)  $357,000  $411,000 
(Note: hypothetical  figures based on conversations with industry representatives.) 
In this example, if the plant size has to be chosen before demand is announced, the firm will invest in a 
smaller plant, because the expected profit is higher.  This is true even for a risk-neutral firm (as is assumed here) 
because of the structure of costs of vaccine production.   
If demand is determined in advance of investment in plant size, the firm will build a small plant if demand 
is low, and a large plant if demand is high. As the table below shows, the expected result of this sequence is 
better for both the firm and the buyers. 






Expected profit for firm  $411K $428K 
Expected price of vaccines   $0.38 $0.33 
Expected quantity of vaccines purchased  4.4m 6.1m 
  
In other words, in this illustrative example, if firms and buyers can agree on the level of demand 
before investment in plant is made, the result would be lower prices, higher quantities of vaccines purchased 
and used, and higher profits for firms, than if the firm has to invest in production before demand is determined.    
 The  second reason why demand uncertainty leads to low investment in production and higher prices is 
that prices are set through a negotiation between a producer with market exclusivity and a buyer with 
market power.  The economics of negotiations between bilateral monopolies is complex: the equilibrium 
price and quantity can vary significantly, depending on the bargaining strength of each side. This in turn is 
related to each side’s “outside option” – that is, whether buyers have an alternative way to spend their money, 
and whether sellers could sell their production to somebody else.   When a producer sinks a large investment in 
a vaccine plant without having a contract with the buyers, they gamble that they will be able to recoup these 
costs through sales.  When the producer and buyers subsequently negotiate prices and quantities for the 
vaccine, the investment in plant and in R&D are sunk costs.  This means that the producer is always better off 
selling vaccines if the price is above marginal cost than allowing the deal to fall through, even if this fails to 
recoup the full cost of their investment.  The buyers are aware of this, and can use their bargaining power to 
drive the price down towards marginal cost.  Although the buyers may not be able to buy this particular vaccine 
elsewhere, they can choose to buy vaccines for a different disease, which will also have health benefits, so they 
 23 have a relatively strong negotiating position. A firm with capacity to produce vaccines sufficient to meet a 
significant share of global demand, by contrast, has nobody else to sell to. As a result, prices tend to fall 
towards marginal costs, and firms have little prospect of recovering the fixed costs of their investments. 
When deciding how big a plant to build, therefore, producers anticipate that a larger plant would produce 
more vaccines at lower unit costs, but that prices would fall commensurately so that the buyers, rather than the 
producer, will secure the benefits of returns to scale.  If the producer expects prices to fall to around marginal 
costs, so that they do not recoup their investment, then the effect for them of investing in a bigger plant is that 
they make a bigger overall loss. Furthermore, if the producer builds a larger plant, and the volume of 
production increases, their scope for selling their production at the margin to other buyers (e.g. rich country 
governments) is reduced. This reduces their bargaining power in negotiations with the bulk procurement 
agencies.  A rational firm may therefore decide not to make the investment in large volume production, with 
the result that prices and volumes are higher. 
The strategic bargaining outcome is significantly altered if the price and quantity are negotiated before the 
investment in production is decided.  At this stage, the producer has a stronger negotiating position: the 
investment in production facilities are not yet sunk costs, and so if the buyers wish to secure larger volumes 
and lower prices, they will have to make an offer to producers which is sufficiently attractive to persuade the 
producer to invest in a larger plant. 
  In summary, there are two theoretical considerations which suggest that there would be significant 
benefits from making demand for vaccines more predictable, both for buyers, who benefit from lower prices 
and higher volumes, and for firms who benefit from higher profits.  First, uncertainty of demand means that a 
profit-maximizing producer would invest in a smaller plant, rather than risk a large investment on which they 
may not earn a sufficient return. This effect is caused by the shape of the cost curve, not by risk aversion on the 
part of the firm. Second, if price and quantity are only negotiated once investment costs are sunk, producers 
have less incentive to invest in large plants as their bargaining power – which is reduced as plant size increases 
– is likely to be less than the buyers’, resulting in an inability to recover costs through sales. 
This analysis shows that it is unlikely to be sensible for buyers to “keep their options open” to decide 
how much vaccine to buy when vaccines are needed. They would be better off if they eschew the option to 
negotiate the best possible price once the vaccine plant is built.  In the simple quantified example above, the 
expected number of vaccines purchased could be increased by 50 percent if donors would specify demand in 
advance of production facilities being built. 
Estimating the size of the gains from predictability 
  The discussion above suggests that there are good theoretical reasons for thinking that there are gains 
for both producers and buyers from increasing the predictability of demand, by allowing producers to invest in 
large production plants.   
  It is difficult to be certain how large these gains might be. In principle, they could be very significant: 
returns to scale in vaccine production are very large – so building a plant that can produce twice as many 
vaccines could result in unit costs falling by around a half. 
  Modeling these gains is hampered by two constraints: 
•  we cannot observe the cost structure of vaccine production; 
•  it is technically complex to model bargaining between a monopoly supplier and monopsony buyer; it 
requires a game theoretic approach, as opposed to estimating a supply curve and demand curve, and 
the equilibrium depends on estimates of the value of outside options, reputation effects, degrees of 
market exclusivity, and other determinants of bargaining power. 
We have instead sought to estimate the likely impact of predictability on vaccine prices using scenarios for 
the price of pentavalent vaccines prepared for the GAVI Board.
47   These scenarios use price assumptions 
 24 based on demand quantities and projected number of manufacturers becoming WHO pre-qualified. The price 
levels in the various scenarios have been discussed among the vaccine supply community, but they have not 
been agreed to with manufacturers.  Their purpose is to illustrate different projected pricing trends. 
For the purposes of Scenario III, the IFFIm scenario which includes both front-loading and 
predictability, we have assumed that the price trajectory for pentavalent vaccine
48 is consistent with the GAVI 
high volume scenario, in which pentavalent vaccine is introduced throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia by around 2010, leading to demand of 130 million doses a year.  On this scenario, the price is 
predicted to drop below $2.00.   
For Scenario I, which does not assume predictability, we assume more limited investment in 
production capacity, which we assume is consistent with the medium demand scenario of about 50 million 
doses of pentavalent per year. 
For Scenario II, in which demand is predictable but spending is not front-loaded, we have assumed that 
prices are will be slightly higher than Scenario III, which front-loads the payments.  This difference reflects the 
likelihood that, even if demand is predictable, firms will still discount future revenues to the extent that they 
perceive some risk that buyers will change their policies in the future. We have therefore assumed a price 
trajectory which is 5% above the prices in Scenario III.  (This price trajectory does not match one of the GAVI 
price scenarios; instead it assumes prices which are slightly higher than the low price scenario.) 
In order to project the prices for monovalent Hib and Hepatitis B vaccines, we assumed that the prices 
of individual vaccines adjust so that the cost of the pentavalent vaccine is equivalent to the combined cost of 
DTP, Hib and Hepatitis B separately. The resulting price trajectories are shown in Chart 1 on page 17. 
For simplicity, predictability is assumed to lower the prices for HepB, MCV2, and yellow fever 
vaccines by 20%.  There is no additional reduction in these prices from front-loading.  Thus, Hib is the only 
vaccine which has a price reduction under front-loading. 
Finally, we assumed that there is no significant difference for prices of well-established vaccines such 
as OPV and DTP, which are already very cheap, as these are produced in large volumes at low prices, with a 
large number of suppliers able to enter the market. 
Predictability and prices: conclusion 
  Vaccine prices may be characterized as a prisoners’ dilemma problem, in which both parties are worse 
off as a result of lack of ability to commit in advance. There would be scope for significant benefits to both 
buyers and sellers if demand and prices were agreed to before production investment takes place through some 
type of commitment mechanism. Theory tells us that these benefits may be large – of the order of price 
reductions of 50% or more. 
  In order to estimate these effects for the purpose of the current analysis, we have relied on GAVI 
estimates of the impact on prices of changes in demand.  The differences between these price scenarios 
probably understate the possible benefits of more predictable demand, but they provide a plausible basis for a 
lower bound of the size of the benefit that might be obtained. 
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An SIR model is an epidemiological model that predicts the number of people infected with a 
contagious illness in a closed population over time.  The model gets its name from the fact that it involves 
equations that link the number of susceptible people, the number of people infected, and the number of people 
who have recovered and developed immunity to infection.  Anderson and May
49 set out a mathematical 
framework for SIR models.  Theoretical models typically use differential or difference equations. Difference 
equations used for numerical solutions are highly dependent on the units of time chosen.   
Even quite simple SIR models based on simple differential equations linking these three categories of 
people typically exhibit complex, non-linear dynamics, which appear to correspond to complex non-linearities 
in the evolution of disease epidemics.  For our purposes, however, it is the evolution of disease burden over 
time, rather than the short term dynamics, that are of interest.  
In SIR models, a key parameter is R0, which is the number of people infected by a contact with an 
infected person in a completely susceptible population, sometimes called the basic reproduction number or 
epidemiological threshold.  If R0 is less than one, then each person who contracts the disease will infect fewer 
than one additional person before dying or recovering, and the epidemic will eventually die out.  But if R0 is 
bigger than one, each person who gets the disease will infect more than one other person, and the epidemic will 
spread (in the absence of policy interventions).   
Assume a simple model in which SIR model, in which the “force of infection”, λ, decreases as vaccination 
rates increases, if the vaccination rate is insufficient to eradicate the disease.  In this simple SIR model, 
 the 
percentage change in disease burden for each cohort as a result of herd immunity is equal to the percentage 
change in the force of infection.
 50
Assuming type II survival
51 (for ease of calculation) and ignoring dynamic terms, in equilibrium, using 
equation (5.7) from Anderson & May (1991 p.91): 
λ =  µ . R0  . (pc – p)                                                                           (1) 
where 
µ = a constant (cancels out below) 
λ = force of infection 
R0 = basic rate of reproduction for the disease 
pc =  critical vaccination proportion = (1 – 1 / R0 ) 
p = proportion of effective vaccination (coverage rate x effectiveness) 
•  So in equilibrium (from eqn (1)): 
θt = λ't / λ =  (1 – 1 / R0 – p't) 
         --------------------                                                                 (2) 
          (1 – 1 / R0 – p) 
where 
θt is the change in the force of infection  
p' is the effective vaccination rate for current cohort 
p  is the effective vaccination rate at baseline (whole population) 
λ't is the force of infection at the higher rate of vaccination 
λ  is the force of infection at baseline 
•  Let εt = sum of additional people effectively vaccinated under the IFFIm.  
p't = p + εt / Nt                                                                                                  (3) 
where 
 26 Nt is the population size 
p' is the effective vaccination rate for current cohort 
 
•  Then in equilibrium, the estimated change in the burden of disease at time t caused by the increase in 
vaccinations is given by this multiplier θt:  
θt  =           (1 – 1 / R0 – p - εt / Nt ) 
         ----------------------------                                                        (4) 
         (1 – 1 / R0 – p) 
 
•  We can use θt as an estimate the change in the burden of disease for the population as a whole resulting 
from the reduced equilibrium force of infection. 
 
Approximations and assumptions 
This approach makes a number of important simplifying assumptions: 
•  it ignores the complex dynamics of the epidemiological response; even in simple models, the force of 
infection fluctuates around the long term equilibrium before it settles down, possibly with large 
amplitude; we ignore this effect, in part because the cumulative lagged effects of an increasing 
vaccination rate may offset each other, and in part for computational ease; 
 
•  it ignores any change in health burden arising from a delay in the onset of disease as a result of 
increased herd immunity; 
 
•  it assumes homogenous, mixing populations; 
 
•  it assumes the vaccination rate for the existing stock of population is the current (baseline) vaccination 
rate (ie it assumes that current vaccination rates have existed for a long time); there are many cases for 
which this assumption is inaccurate – for example, there have been a significant number of measles 
campaigns between 1999 and 2005; 
 
•  we assume the basic rate of reproduction (R0) given in Table 4.1 of Anderson and May (p70); and we 
constrained θt to be positive (negative values are possible when R0 is small and vaccine coverage high). 
 
•  the approach would not apply to tetanus, which is not contagious and for which there is therefore no 
herd immunity; it would apply (with different choice of R0)  to all the other diseases under 
consideration; 
 
•  we have estimated the reduction in the burden of disease (using the multiplier θt) for the cohorts that 
obtain vaccinations under the additional vaccination program, by assuming that each cohort makes up 
approximately 1/40
th of the population; but we have not included the reduction in disease resulting 
from herd immunity for those cohorts born before the additional vaccination begins, nor the reduction 
for those born after the vaccination program comes to an end; thus,  we approximate the term εt using 
the cumulative sum of additional individuals vaccinated under IFFIm (over projected baseline vaccine 
coverages) in cohorts born between the years of 2006 to 2020; Nt is approximated with 40, a parameter 
that can also represent the length of herd immunity; 
 
•  The effective vaccination rate at baseline for the whole population (in our case, for a sub-region), p, is 
difficult to determine because each disease has different transmission characteristics and herd 
immunity effects that depend differently on past routine vaccinations and campaigns; we have thus 
made the simplifying assumption of approximating p using the baseline vaccination coverage in a 
particular sub-region in each year (the herd immunity parameter θt is calculated each year between 
2006 and 2020). 
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1.  Most vaccine models specify a coverage rate for a particular vaccine in each country at each point in 
time and derive the health benefits and amount of required spending.  In order to compare the three 
scenarios in our analysis, we make coverage rates a function of the model instead, using the costs and 
actual amount of money spent in each of the three scenarios as the main exogenous parameters.  To 
determine the spending patterns, we assume that the allocation of spending across diseases, countries, 
and time remains proportionally the same in all scenarios.  The proportional spending on each vaccine 
in Scenario 3 follows as closely as possible the coverage rates and costs of the IFFIm package 
estimated by the WHO Immunization, Vaccines and Biologicals Division, as set out in the IFFIm 
proposal.  The same spending patterns for each vaccine and each country are maintained for the 15 
year scenarios and simply spread out proportionally over 15 years. 
2.  The number of tetanus, yellow fever, Measles Containing Vaccine (MCV) catch-up and MCV 
follow-up campaigns are assumed to be the same in all scenarios.  
3.  The total vaccine cost is estimated as (actual cost of each vaccine + freight charge + syringe cost) x 
required number of doses x 1/(1-wastage rate) 
4.  Systems costs consist of delivery costs and infrastructure costs.  Delivery costs are increasing in 
population coverage for each country and are specific to the coverage level for a particular vaccine.  
Delivery costs are derived from the cost per outpatient visit from the WHO-CHOICE website 
(http://www3.who.int/whosis/cea/prices/unit.cfm?path=whosis,cea,cea_prices,cea_prices_un
it&language=english).  The delivery costs are treated as marginal costs rather than average costs to 
obtain coverage rates from available spending.  Systems costs are assumed to be a constant proportion 
(7 percent) of the total delivery cost.  No account is taken of lumpiness in systems spending; and 
systems spending has no benefits in subsequent years (ie it is assumed to be amortized).  Systems costs 
cover routine systems and vaccines.  Systems support for the introduction of vaccines is assumed to be 
7.2% of IFFIm spending (after any financing costs) in all scenarios. 
5.  4.4% of IFFIm spending (after any financing costs) is set aside for polio stockpile in all scenarios.  No 
health benefits are calculated for the stockpile in any scenario.  The costs of polio vaccine stockpiles 
are excluded from the cost per DALY estimates. 
6.  All figures are expressed in real terms, in 2005 prices. 
7.  While coverage rates under each scenario are calculated at the country level, disease burden is 
calculated at the WHO sub-regional level.  Where necessary, averages by sub-region (e.g. coverage 
rates by sub-region) are birth-cohort-weighted averages (or 
infants-surviving-to-one-year-cohort-weighted averages with vaccines where infants surviving to age 
one are vaccinated rather than the entire birth cohort) across all countries in the region. 
8.  The disease burden calculation has discount rates in two places.  The “real discount rate” is used to 
discount future disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) to obtain the discounted average number of 
DALYs lost due to each disease for a person born in a particular WHO sub-region.  This can be 
thought of as the lifetime burden that would be relieved by vaccination over the lifetime of the typical 
newly born person in a country.  The “discount rate for disease burden” is used to discount future 
DALYs averted during the length of the proposed IFFIm program (e.g. DALYs saved by vaccinations 
in 2007 are discounted by a further 3% compared to DALYs saved by vaccination in 2006).   
9.  Hib and yellow fever DALY data are limited, so the disease burden for those two diseases is estimated.  
The current DALY burden for Hib is estimated by calculating the relationship between deaths and 
DALYs for lower respiratory infections, and applying this relationship to the WHO regional estimates 
of deaths due to Hib.  The current DALY burden for yellow fever is estimated by calculating the 
relationship between deaths and DALYs for dengue fever, and applying this relationship to WHO 
regional estimates for deaths due to yellow fever.   
 28 10.  The health benefits of measles, tetanus, and yellow fever campaigns have not been explicitly 
calculated in the model to simplify the analysis.  In order to make the three scenarios comparable, the 
assumption was made that campaign spending remains the same in all three scenarios.  Even if lower 
coverage levels “trigger” an additional campaign to be required in a country, we have assumed that the 
funding for the additional campaign does not come from the IFFIm to keep the resource allocation and 
spending comparable in the three scenarios.   
As a result, the direct vaccination benefits (health benefits to those immunized) are roughly equal in all 
three scenarios because the same number of campaigns are being funded in each country in each 
scenario.  To simplify the analysis, we have not explicitly calculated these direct vaccination benefits, 
which can vary depending on the age of vaccination.  Campaigns attempt to vaccinate a wider 
age-range of the population, and thus, require additional assumptions of the amount of DALYs saved 
depending on the age of the person vaccinated.  The DALY benefit to each person vaccinated in a 
campaign may differ substantially from the lifetime DALY burden we calculate in the model for a 
vaccinated infant. Since we had already assumed that the same number of campaigns in each country 
were being funded in all three scenarios, we simplified the analysis by not calculating health benefits 
of campaigns.   
For purposes of better comparing the magnitudes between the three scenarios, we have made a 
conservative assumption that campaigns result in approximately 27 million DALYs averted in each 
scenario. It is likely that campaigns will have greater herd immunity benefits in Scenario III when 
spending is both predictable and front-loaded because higher vaccination coverage levels are reached.  
Adding 27 million DALYs saved to each scenario therefore under-estimates the differences between 
the scenarios.  We believe that adding 27 million DALYs saved to each scenario is a rough 
approximation for the benefit of campaigns that does not lead to a substantial over- or under-estimate 
of the effects of predictability and front-loading. 
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ADIP Accelerated  Development and Introduction Plan 
DALY  Disability Adjusted Life Year 
DPT  Diphtheria Pertussis and Tetanus 
EPI  Expanded Programme of Immunisation 
GAVI      Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
HepB Hepatitis  B 
Hib  Haemophilus influenzae  Type B 
HMT  Her Majesty’s Treasury 
IPV Inactivated  poliovirus  vaccine 
IFF  International Finance Facility 
IFFIm      International Finance Facility for Immunisation 
IFFIm Co  IFFIm Company 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
LIC  Low Income Country 
MDG Millennium  Development  Goal 
NPV  Net Present Value 
OPV  Oral Polio Vaccine 
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity 
UK United  Kingdom 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
VF     Vaccine  Fund 
VPD  Vaccine Preventable Diseases 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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